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[757] 
Notes 
Efficient Proximate Cause:  
Is California Headed for a Katrina-Scale 
Disaster in the Same Leaky Boat? 
Jacqueline Young* 
The threat of natural disaster looms each year over many states in the U.S. Although 
major disasters are, in that sense, predictable, they nevertheless strike without warning. 
The private insurance industry has proven incapable of absorbing the risk. Adding to 
the problem is the fact that the law, in many states, allows insurance companies to skirt 
around disaster coverage by inserting anti-concurrent causation (“ACC”) clauses into 
their property insurance policies. Even in states where the law appears to bar such 
clauses, state programs aimed at increasing disaster insurance have failed to yield 
sufficient coverage to support the total amount in claims that would be produced 
following another Katrina-scale event. The extensive privation following Hurricane 
Katrina is proof-positive that America is not yet equipped to deal with large-scale 
natural catastrophe. Unfortunately, while the federal government can and does 
becomes the de facto “insurance plan” for all disaster-prone states, its response to past 
episodes has been ad hoc, at best. 
This Note examines the concurrent causation question and takes a close look at the 
courts’ troubling treatment of ACC language following Hurricane Katrina. It goes on 
to contrast the stat of the law in the Gulf region with that of California, arguing that 
while California seems to have established a bright-line rule barring ACC clauses, 
recent decisions have brought the integrity of this rule into question. While California’s 
approach to the concurrent causation question could produce a workable solution for 
other disaster-prone states to observe, the California courts must first revitalize the rule 
barring ACC clauses, and the state must develop a solution to encourage more 
homeowners to purchase catastrophe insurance. Finally, the Note proposes a two-
pronged solution, advocating both a judicial response, as well as the reintroduction of 
the Homeowners’ Defense Act of 2009. By enacting the Homewoners’ Defense Act, the 
federal government can take a proactive, instead of reactive, approach to natural 
disaster relief. 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2011. I would like to 
thank Professor Leo Martinez for his patience and guidance throughout this process. I would also like 
to thank Sara Tosdal and the staff of the Hastings Law Journal for their hard work and camaraderie. 
This Note is dedicated to my husband Eric Young, who has been a stalwart companion throughout law 
school, and to our family for all the love and support. 
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Introduction 
Hurricane Katrina caught the entire country off guard. After the 
waters receded, a so-called “second storm” erupted in the courts and in 
the media.1 Katrina exposed significant weaknesses in insurance 
causation jurisprudence in the Gulf States and serves as an unfortunate 
warning to other disaster-prone states. By comparison, California seems 
prepared for a major catastrophe, defined for these purposes as a 250-
year earthquake event.2 In fact, California’s plan might be considered a 
 
 1. David P. Rossmiller, Interpretation and Enforcement of Anti-Concurrent Policy Language in 
Hurricane Katrina Cases and Beyond, in New Appleman on Insurance: Current Critical Issues in 
Insurance Law 43, 46, 64 (2007). 
 2. Approaches to Mitigating and Managing Natural Catastrophe Risk: H.R. 2555, The 
Homeowners’ Defense Act: Joint Hearing on H.R. 2555 Before the Subcomm. on Hous. and Cmty. 
Opportunity and the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins. and Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on 
Fin. Servs., 111 Cong. 12–14 (2010) [hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of Glenn Pomeroy, Chief Exec. 
Officer, Cal. Earthquake Auth.); Barbara Bowers, Funding the Inevitable, Best’s Rev., Feb. 2005, at 
21, 24. 
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workable option for other disaster-prone states—an example to follow. 
But California homeowners are not as secure as they appear. As only 
twelve-to-thirteen percent of California homeowners have purchased the 
earthquake insurance coverage they need to protect their homes from 
catastrophic loss,3 the danger of a catastrophic earthquake to 
homeowners is readily apparent. This Note traces California’s approach 
to concurrent causation, arguing that it may be exemplary with added 
judicial and legislative support. This Note seeks to answer: How can 
California avoid a massive federal bailout and the arresting results of a 
Katrina-scale disaster? 
Part I will give a brief background on first-party property insurance 
policies as relates to the causation question, the efficient proximate cause 
doctrine, and anti-concurrent clauses. Part II will take a closer look at the 
legal maelstrom that followed Katrina and will juxtapose it with 
California’s approach to causation, revealing that while it has been often 
presumed that California draws bright-line rules on the concurrent 
causation question, recent case law suggests that the bright line is fading. 
Part II will further argue that California homeowners, even those with 
homeowner’s insurance, are exposed to a significant amount of 
uninsured risk following a major earthquake. 
Finally, Part III will attempt to solve these problems by proposing a 
multilayered solution. At the judicial level, the California courts should 
strictly curtail the effect of recent decisions that undermine California’s 
approach to concurrent causation. At the legislative level, representatives 
should reintroduce and Congress should adopt the Homeowners’ 
Defense Act of 20094 (“HDA”), a federal disaster relief solution that had 
been under consideration in the previous term.5 This approach may well 
be a workable example for other disaster-prone states to follow. 
 
 3. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 13; see also Bowers, supra note 2. 
 4. H.R. 2555 [111th]: Homeowners’ Defense Act of 2010, GovTrack.us, http://www.govtrack.us/ 
congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-2555 (last visited Feb. 2, 2011) [hereinafter Homeowners’ Defense Act of 
2010]. Although the HDA was introduced in 2009, it remained under consideration throughout 2010 
and is sometimes referred to as the Homeowners’ Defense Act of 2010. See, e.g., id. Because many 
sources refer to it by its 2009 title, and for the purposes of consistency, I will refer to it only as the 
Homeowners’ Defense Act of 2009. At the time this Note went to print, the HAD had not yet been 
reintroduced in Congress’s 112th Term, see id, and although this Note argues that it ought to be 
reintroduced, the solution this Note proposes is not dependent upon the HDA. The larger goal is to 
urge a federal disaster insurance scheme, and while the HDA is the most promising option currently 
available, other similarly well-conceived federal schemes would be equally applicable. 
 5. H.R. 2555, 111th Cong. (2009). 
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I.  The Tangled Web of Insurance Causation 
In contrast to named-peril policies,6 all-risk policies cover all losses 
to a property unless the cause of the loss is expressly excluded by the 
policy terms.7 While the determination of whether coverage applies to a 
loss resulting from single or multiple causes is typically straightforward, 
problems arise when a loss results from multiple causes, one of which is 
excluded under the policy. Suppose, for example, a policy covers rain 
damage but not mudslide. What happens when a home is destroyed by a 
mudslide caused by heavy rain? Is the mudslide the culprit, or is the rain? 
What about when two independent but simultaneous causes destroy 
property, such as a plane crash occurring at the same instant as a 
mudslide? 
A. The Efficient Proximate Cause Doctrine 
The prevailing approach for analyzing causation issues in first-party 
property insurance coverage cases has been the efficient proximate cause 
(“EPC”) doctrine.8 Under this doctrine, recovery is generally permitted 
“for a loss caused by a combination of a covered risk and an excluded 
risk only if the covered risk was the efficient proximate cause of the 
loss.”9 Depending upon the jurisdiction, the EPC might be defined as the 
“predominant” or most important cause in the chain of events,10 or 
alternatively, as the “prime” or “moving” cause11 of the loss: the cause 
that “set the chain of events in motion.”12 There are nearly as many 
interpretations of the doctrine as there are jurisdictions to apply it, and 
the courts have utterly failed to reach a consensus.13 This lack of 
uniformity leaves insurer and insured alike in an untoward state of 
uncertainty.14 As a result, at least three states, including Florida, 
 
 6. A named-peril, or “specified-risk,” policy is one that covers loss to the named property only if 
the loss resulted from any of the specifically identified risks in the policy. Robert H. Jerry, II & 
Douglas R. Richmond, Understanding Insurance Law 391 (4th ed. 2007); Roy C. McCullough, 
Property Insurance, 1963 Ins. L.J. 75, 84. 
 7. Jerry & Richmond, supra note 6. 
 8. At least thirty-five states employ some version of the EPC doctrine in first-party property 
cases. Michael C. Phillips & Lisa L. Coplen, Concurrent Causation Versus Efficient Proximate Cause in 
First-Party Property Insurance Coverage Analysis, 36 Brief 32, 33, 35–39 (Winter 2007). For an 
interesting discussion on the history and development of the doctrine, see Julie A. Passa, Comment, 
Insurance Law—Property Insurance: Adopting the Efficient Proximate Cause Doctrine, But Saying No 
to Contracting Out of It, 79 N.D. L. Rev. 561, 564–72 (2003). 
 9. 7 Lee R. Russ & Thomas F. Segalla, Couch on Insurance § 101:55 (3d ed. 2005). 
 10. See, e.g., Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 P.2d 704, 707 (Cal. 1989). 
 11. See, e.g., id. at 708. 
 12. 7 Russ & Segalla, supra note 9, § 101:45. 
 13. Id. § 101:43. 
 14. Joseph Lavitt, The Doctrine of Efficient Proximate Cause, the Katrina Disaster, Prosser’s 
Folly, and the Third Restatement of Torts: Cracking the Conundrum, 54 Loy. L. Rev. 1, 6–7 (2008); see 
also Michael E. Bragg, Concurrent Causation and the Art of Policy Drafting: New Perils for Property 
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Minnesota, and Wisconsin, have expressly rejected the doctrine, and 
insurers have incorporated “anti-concurrent cause” language into their 
policies to replace the EPC analysis.15 
Complicating matters further, the doctrine applies in situations 
where multiple causes occur in a causal chain,16 but it does not apply in 
situations where completely independent causes simultaneously produce 
an indivisible loss,17 as in the airplane/mudslide example above. At 
common law, where two independent, concurrent causes act to produce a 
loss, the insurer need only cover the part of the damage proven to have 
resulted from the covered causes.18 The common law approach is 
unsatisfying, because it may be difficult to distinguish which damage 
resulted from a covered cause in a particular case, and the insured may 
not receive the full amount of coverage for which they bargained and 
paid premiums. 
A small number of jurisdictions have dealt with this problem by 
adopting a more liberal approach: the concurrent causation doctrine.19 
This approach applies a “but for” analysis similar to that in tort law.20 
Under the concurrent causation doctrine, a loss would be wholly covered 
if it “would not have occurred but for the contribution of a covered” 
peril.21 In other words, the loss is covered as long as at least one cause, 
whether independent or dependent, meaningfully contributed to the loss 
and was a covered peril.22 
B. Anti-Concurrent Cause Clause Language 
In order to shift the causation analysis in their favor, insurers have 
recently developed anti-concurrent cause (“ACC”) clauses that attempt 
to override the EPC doctrine, to strengthen the control of the contract 
language, and to prevent coverage for claims not anticipated when the 
polices were created.23 Developments in the California courts, in cases 
such as Sabella v. Wisler,24 State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 
 
Insurers, 20 Forum 385, 388–89 (1985) (explaining that the decisions of the California courts, in 
particular, have caused a great deal of uncertainty for insurers, as they have used the efficient 
proximate cause doctrine to create “new ‘causes’ of loss never contemplated by property insurance 
policy drafters”). 
 15. Lavitt, supra note 14, at 16–17 & n.73. 
 16. 7 Russ & Segalla, supra note 9, § 101:55. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. § 101:49. 
 19. See Phillips & Coplen, supra note 8, at 35–39 (listing seven states as employing a concurrent 
causation analysis and two states as “uncertain”). 
 20. Id. at 34. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 33–34. 
 23. Rossmiller, supra note 1, at 55. 
 24. 377 P.2d 889 (Cal. 1963). 
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v. Partridge,25 and Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,26 prompted 
the new language. These opinions broadened the scope of coverage far 
past what policy drafters had intended.27 The primary problem was that, 
unlike small-scale, individual losses that could be anticipated using the 
“law of large numbers,”28 large-scale catastrophic losses—caused by, for 
example, hurricane, flood, or earthquake—“are difficult for insurers to 
handle. . . . With this kind of loss, insurers lose the benefit of certainty 
and predictability in actuarial calculations, and face potential losses that 
may possibly exceed their resources.”29 As a result, catastrophic losses 
have been excluded from coverage in typical homeowner’s policies for 
quite some time.30 The California cases threatened that safety net, and 
insurers feared that the courts would refuse to respect the exclusionary 
language of their policies, finding coverage beyond the insurers’ intent.31 
Because the EPC analysis is merely a “default rule” in many 
jurisdictions, approximately twenty states have allowed insurers to 
contract around it, replacing it with ACC policy language intended to 
override the analysis, or at least to eliminate certain unfavorable 
outcomes.32 However, because of the potential for harsh results, four 
states have refused to give effect to ACC clause language.33 Notably, 
California has historically been considered one of those states.34 In the 
states that do give ACC clauses effect, a typical clause drafted by the 
Insurance Services Office (“ISO”) might read: 
1. We do not cover loss to any property resulting directly or indirectly 
from any of the following. Such a loss is excluded even if another peril 
or event contributed concurrently or in any sequence to cause the loss. 
. . . . 
(b) Water or damage caused by water-borne material. Loss 
resulting from water or water-borne material damage described 
below is not covered even if other perils contributed, directly or 
indirectly to cause the loss. Water and water-borne material 
damages means: 
 
 25. 514 P.2d 123 (Cal. 1973). 
 26. 770 P.2d 704 (Cal. 1989); Bragg, supra note 14, at 388–89. 
 27. Bragg, supra note 14, at 388–89. 
 28. See Rossmiller, supra note 1, at 53 (“[W]hen large numbers of independent losses can be 
measured, the average loss becomes relatively easy to calculate, or in other words, there is great 
statistical confidence that any one actual loss will not deviate from the overall loss calculation to a 
degree that it places insurers’ financial solvency in jeopardy.”). 
 29. Id. at 53–54 (footnote omitted); see Richard V. Ericson & Aaron Doyle, Uncertain 
Business: Risk, Insurance, and the Limits of Knowledge 180–84 (2004) (describing the difficulties 
in collecting reliable data on earthquakes and the subjectivity of any data that may be collected). 
 30. Rossmiller, supra note 1, at 54. 
 31. Id. at 59–60 (citing Bragg, supra note 14). 
 32. Id. at 57–58. 
 33. See Phillips & Coplen, supra note 8 (listing California, North Dakota, Washington, and West 
Virginia as having refused to implement the policy language). 
 34. Id. But see discussion infra Part II.B (explaining that this refusal may be wavering in California). 
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(1) flood, surface water, waves, tidal waves, overflow of a body 
of water, spray from these, whether or not driven by wind.35 
The aim of this clause is, ostensibly, to remove the possibility that 
the insurer will be required to cover any water damage whatsoever, even 
if the EPC of the damage was some other covered force, say wind. But 
the danger of this drafting lies in the word “concurrently.” Courts could 
interpret the term “concurrently” in this context to mean that no loss 
shall be covered so long as water was a contributing force when any 
damage occurred. In fact, in Leonard v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance 
Co., Judge Senter interpreted the clause in this fashion and proceeded to 
strike it down as ambiguous,36 explaining that, read literally, such 
phrasing would bar recovery for massive wind damage where even 
nominal water damage occurred at or near the same time.37 
Some ACC clauses are even broader and more restrictive of 
coverage than the ISO language above. Compare that language with the 
following ACC clause developed by State Farm: 
2. We do not insure under any coverage for any loss which would not 
have occurred in the absence of one or more of the following excluded 
events. We do not insure for such loss regardless of: (a) the cause of 
the excluded event; or (b) other causes of the loss; or (c) whether other 
causes acted concurrently or in any sequence with the excluded event 
to produce the loss; or (d) whether the event occurs suddenly or 
gradually, involves isolated or widespread damage, arises from natural 
or external forces, or occurs as a result of any combination of these. 
. . . . 
c. Water Damage, meaning 
(1) flood, surface water, waves, tidal water, tsunami, seiche, 
overflow of a body of water, or spray from any of these, all 
whether driven by wind or not . . . .38 
This language may be seen as the broadest example of ACC 
language, as it applies a “but for” analysis to causation.39 The “but for” 
analysis completely overrides the EPC doctrine: Recovery for a loss is 
barred so long as an excluded cause was a necessary element in the chain 
of events leading to the loss, regardless of whether the excluded cause 
 
 35. Leonard v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 438 F. Supp. 2d 684, 688–89 (S.D. Miss. 2006), aff’d but 
criticized by 499 F.3d 419, 430 (5th Cir. 2007); see Tim Ryles, “Anticoncurrent Causation” Refined by 
Mississippi Supreme Court, IRMI.com, http://www.irmi.com/expert/articles/2010/ryles04-personal-lines-
insurance.aspx (last visited Feb. 2, 2011). 
 36. Id. at 693. Note that although Judge Senter’s reasoning on this point was later criticized by the 
Fifth Circuit, see Leonard, 499 F.3d at 430, it nevertheless serves as a cautionary example of how ACC 
language may appear ambiguous. 
 37. Leonard, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 694. 
 38. Tuepker v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 507 F.3d 346, 351 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 39. Rossmiller, supra note 1, at 63–64. 
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was the initiating cause, the immediately-preceding cause, or something 
in between.40 
II.  Catastrophe in California and the Coastal States: Is Anyone 
Prepared? 
Part I provided a general background on the efficient proximate 
cause doctrine and anti-concurrent cause language. Part II will briefly 
focus on the state of the EPC doctrine and the role of ACC language in 
post-Katrina litigation. Using Hurricane Katrina as a snapshot, I will 
then contrast these results with the current state of California law, 
exposing potential pitfalls. 
A. In the Aftermath of Katrina 
Hurricane Katrina slammed into the Gulf Coast in August 2005, 
killing approximately 1600 people and causing $135 billion in damage.41 
But the storm was just the beginning; the insurance industry immediately 
began implementing tactics to limit its exposure, denying coverage in 
many cases by claiming that the losses were unrelated to wind—a 
covered cause in standard homeowner’s policies—and were caused by 
water—an excluded cause in standard homeowner’s policies.42 Some 
companies even resorted to fraud in an attempt to limit payouts, coercing 
engineers to “re-evaluate” damage to homes when initial reports 
revealed damage from covered causes.43 By 2007, the Louisiana 
Department of Insurance estimated it had received over 9000 consumer 
complaints and requests for aid in resolving benefits disputes with 
insurance companies.44 Insurance claims were valued at approximately 
$60 billion by 2006.45 
What gave the insurance companies such security in denying claims? 
Arguably, they were able to take advantage of the hopelessly confused 
state of the law regarding the EPC doctrine in the coastal states.46 
Insurers of property damaged by Katrina could invoke the ACC clauses 
in their standard homeowner’s policies in an attempt to deny coverage.47 
 
 40. Id. 
 41. Am. Ass’n for Justice, Pattern of Greed 2007: How Insurance Companies Put Profits 
Over Policyholders 3 (2007). 
 42. Id. at 2. 
 43. Id. at 5–6. 
 44. Id. at 4. 
 45. Spencer M. Taylor, Insuring Against the Natural Catastrophe After Katrina, 20 Nat. 
Resources & Env’t 26, 26 (2006). 
 46. See Lavitt, supra note 14, at 31–32 (suggesting that while the “ever-shifting and sometimes 
nonsensical judgments” addressing concurrent causation have created confusion for policyholders and 
insurers alike, insurers have been able to “push the envelope,” because they have the distinct 
advantage of being able to afford to wait out judicial trends). 
 47. Rhonda D. Orin, First-Party Coverage for Catastrophic Risks: Part I—Personal Lines, in 
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It stands to reason that unlike homeowners, who were desperate to 
rebuild their lives, the insurance industry had little to lose and everything 
to gain by stalling. Insurers had the luxury of waiting to see what color 
smoke would rise out of the judicial chimney. Inconsistency and 
uncertainty in the law thus demonstrably leads to significant hardships, 
the brunt of which falls on insureds’ shoulders in times of crisis. 
1. Mississippi: The Smoke Keeps Changing Colors 
The seesawing of court judgments in Katrina litigation has been 
stunning. Cases from the Mississippi courts addressing ACC clauses are 
particularly illustrative. At the outset, the federal courts were compelled 
to examine the issue without guidance from the Mississippi Supreme 
Court, which did not weigh in until 2009.48 The complications began with 
two opposing lines of authority in Mississippi regarding whether the EPC 
doctrine had even been adopted.49 Incredibly, despite the absence of a 
definitive agreement on this fundamental element, the federal courts had 
no trouble issuing decisions on whether ACC clauses could be used to 
circumvent the doctrine.50 
First, in Tuepker v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., the Tuepkers’ 
home was completely destroyed during Katrina, allegedly through a 
combination of wind, rain, and storm surge.51 State Farm denied their 
claim, citing the water damage exclusion in their policy.52 The policy also 
incorporated State Farm’s broad “but for” ACC language, excluding all 
loss “which would not have occurred in the absence of” water damage.53 
Judge Senter, hearing State Farm’s motion to dismiss in the district court, 
found that any damage directly attributable to water (including storm 
surge) was excluded under the policy.54 Conversely, any damage caused 
by wind or wind-born objects was covered.55 In response to State Farm’s 
attempt to use the ACC clause to deny coverage for wind losses that 
would not have occurred “but for” water damage, Judge Senter held that 
 
Insurance Coverage 2007, at 89, 93 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 758, 
2007). 
 48. See infra text accompanying notes 67–77. 
 49. Compare Grace v. Lititz Mut. Ins. Co., 257 So. 2d 217, 224 (Miss. 1972) (explaining that the 
question of proximate cause is one of fact for the jury, and that a showing “that wind was the 
proximate or efficient cause of the loss” will suffice), with Rhoden v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 32 F. 
Supp. 2d 907, 911 (S.D. Miss. 1998) (“Mississippi courts have not specifically adopted the efficient 
proximate cause doctrine . . . .”). 
 50. See Lavitt, supra note 14, at 18–20, 22 (explaining that although two opposing lines of 
authority had emerged in Mississippi, in the Tuepker case, Judge Senter simply ignored Rhoden and 
assumed, under Grace, that Mississippi had adopted the EPC doctrine). 
 51. No. 1:05CV559 LTS-JMR, 2006 WL 1442489, at *1 (S.D. Miss. May 24, 2006). 
 52. Id. 
 53. See supra text accompanying note 38. 
 54. Tuepker, 2006 WL 1442489, at *3. 
 55. Id. 
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the clause was ambiguous and unenforceable; so long as the plaintiffs 
could prove their loss was proximately caused by wind, such loss would 
be covered.56 
In Leonard v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., involving litigation 
of the narrower ISO version of ACC clause language,57 the Leonards’ 
home had not been completely destroyed by Katrina, but had sustained 
an estimated $130,000 in damage.58 At the district court level, Judge 
Senter found that, other than $1200 worth of wind damage, Nationwide 
had met its burden of proving that the bulk of the damage had been 
caused by water, an excluded cause under the policy.59 With regards to an 
ACC clause in the Leonard’s homeowner’s policy, Judge Senter again 
found the language ambiguous and unenforceable when read in 
conjunction with the coverage grant for wind, explaining that when read 
literally, the terms would exclude any damage where even de minimis 
concurrent water damage was involved.60 
On appeal in both cases, the Fifth Circuit changed course on the 
ACC clause issue. Hearing Leonard first, the court found, “Contrary to 
the district court’s ruling, Nationwide’s ACC clause is not ambiguous, 
nor does Mississippi law preempt the causation regime the clause applies 
to hurricane claims.”61 In an “Erie guess,”62 the Fifth Circuit read 
Mississippi case law to indicate that the EPC doctrine was the default 
rule,63 but that Mississippi law did not forbid the use of ACC clauses to 
circumvent that rule.64 A few months later, the Fifth Circuit found in 
Tuepker that the broader language of State Farm’s ACC clause was no 
more ambiguous in conjunction with the other clauses in the policy than 
was the ACC clause at issue in Leonard.65 Relying on its decision in 
Leonard, the court held in Tuepker that the ACC clause was enforceable 
and had effectively overridden the EPC doctrine.66 
Finally, in Corban v. United Services Automobile Ass’n, the 
Mississippi Supreme Court weighed in on the subject.67 There, the 
Corbans’ home had been damaged to the estimated tune of $1,607,926.68 
After sending an engineer to review the damage, United States 
 
 56. Id. at *5. 
 57. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 58. Leonard v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 438 F. Supp. 2d 684, 689–90 (S.D. Miss. 2006), aff’d but 
criticized by 499 F.3d 419, 430 (5th Cir. 2007); see also supra text accompanying note 35. 
 59. Leonard, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 696. 
 60. Id. at 694. 
 61. Leonard v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 499 F.3d 419, 430 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 62. Id. at 431. 
 63. Id. at 431–32. 
 64. Id. at 436. 
 65. Tuepker v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 507 F.3d 346, 354–55 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 66. Id. at 356. 
 67. 20 So. 3d 601, 617–18 (Miss. 2009). 
 68. Id. at 606. 
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Automobile Association paid out $83,903.77 for wind damage and 
$350,000 under a separate flood policy, leaving $1,174,022.23 in claims 
unpaid.69 Predictably, it denied the remaining claimed amount under the 
water damage exclusion in the homeowner’s policy.70 Even more 
predictably, the homeowner’s policy included the following ACC clause 
to water damage: “We do not insure for loss caused directly or indirectly 
by any of the following. Such loss is excluded regardless of any other 
cause or event contributing concurrently or in any sequence to the loss.”71 
The court proceeded to reject the lower court’s application of the Fifth 
Circuit’s analysis, explaining that ACC clauses would only apply in the 
event that wind and water causes were “truly ‘concurrent.’”72 In other 
words, the language would only be triggered when “wind and flood 
simultaneously converg[e] and operat[e] in conjunction to damage the 
property,” thereby creating an “‘indivisible’ loss.”73 According to the 
court, this was not the case in Corban, where wind and water had acted 
independently.74 Therefore, if wind loss occurred first and water loss 
followed, the insured must still be covered for any loss proven caused by 
wind.75 Similarly, if water loss occurred first and wind loss after, the 
insured is covered for wind loss proven beyond the water loss.76 Notably, 
the court admitted that under this assessment, the outcome would 
depend upon which party has the burden of proof.77 
As is clear from this parade of case law, courts have had difficulty 
applying concurrent causation analyses and ACC clauses. With no 
consensus, both insurers and insureds alike suffer.78 Unfortunately, it is 
often the insured who bears the heaviest burden, as the insurance 
companies have the luxury of waiting to pay out claims until they are 
forced to do so by a ponderous legal system—a rare outcome indeed.79 
Such inequity leads to inevitable public outcry. Particularly in the 
wake of the damage and litigation spawned by Katrina, ACC clauses 
were attacked as contrary to public policy and as attempts to strip 
 
 69. Id. at 606–07. 
 70. Id. at 606. 
 71. Id. at 612 (emphasis omitted). 
 72. Id. at 618. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 616–17. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 618–19. 
 78. See, e.g., Erik S. Knutsen, Confusion About Causation in Insurance: Solutions for Catastrophic 
Losses, 61 Ala. L. Rev. 957, 959–60, 979–81 (2010); Lavitt, supra note 14, at 32–33; Banks McDowell, 
Causation in Contracts and Insurance, 20 Conn. L. Rev. 569, 585 (1988). 
 79. See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text (explaining that after disaster strikes, insurers 
have every incentive to deny claims until a court declares that coverage existed, and that insureds 
suffer in the interim, as they often cannot begin to rebuild their lives until their claims are paid). 
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insureds of coverage for which they had dutifully paid premiums.80 
Against this tide, some scholars deem these concerns to be widely 
inflated.81 They argue that ACC language should not have come into the 
equation at all in many Katrina cases, as wind and water were two 
separate, nonconcurrent forces causing distinct damage to many homes.82 
With the exception, perhaps, of the Mississippi Supreme Court, the 
courts have misapplied ACC language as a result of widespread 
misunderstanding of concurrent causation.83 In any event, scholars opine, 
ACC clause language is likely to remain in insurance policies as “its 
fundamental underpinnings are contracts, and the reason-to-be of 
contracts is to provide predictable results.”84 
Whether or not ACC clause language was properly questioned in 
the Katrina cases, this commentary magnifies the larger issue: Courts 
frequently apply EPC and concurrent causation analyses erratically, 
leaving insurers and insureds forever guessing. But, as I will argue, 
California’s approach to the concurrent causation analysis can provide a 
solution to these problems. 
2. In the Absence of Insurance 
Without insurance companies, who foots the bill in the wake of a 
catastrophic event? In short, the federal and state governments do. After 
Katrina, the federal government dispatched the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA), along with a massive federal bailout 
amounting to upwards of $50 billion by 2008.85 Unfortunately, most ad 
hoc federal aid programs are inefficient at best,86 and even federal aid 
could not restore the status quo. Despite FEMA’s efforts to pick up the 
slack, insurance companies began doubling and tripling insurance rates, 
and some outright refused to issue new property insurance policies in the 
coastal region.87 
 
 80. See Inquiry into Insurance Claims Payment Processes in the Gulf Coast After the 2005 
Hurricane: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Fin. 
Servs., 110th Cong. 10–15 (2007) (testimony of Jim Hood, Att’y Gen. of Miss.); Gene Taylor, 
Hurricane Katrina Special Edition: Federal Insurance Reform After Katrina, 77 Miss. L.J. 783, 784–90 
(2008). 
 81. Rossmiller, supra note 1, at 83–84. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 84. 
 85. FEMA Gulf Coast Recovery 3 Years Later, FEMA (Aug. 26, 2008), http://www.fema.gov/news/ 
newsrelease.fema?id=45545. 
 86. See Jonathan Orszag & Doug Fontaine, An Economic Assessment of the Homeowners’ 
Defense Act of 2009 1 (2009); Lavitt, supra note 14, at 46; Barack Obama, Op-Ed., Spread Risk with 
National Disaster Fund, St. Petersburg Times (Sept. 7, 2008), http://www.tampabay.com/opinion/ 
essays/spread-risk-with-national-disaster-fund/798581. 
 87. See, e.g., Rawle O. King, Cong. Research Serv., RL 33892, Post-Katrina Insurance Issues 
Surrounding Water Damage Exclusions in Homeowners’ Insurance Policies 3 (2007); Taylor, 
supra note 80, at 788; Kathy Chu, Insurance Costs Become 3rd Storm, USA Today, Apr. 3, 2007, at 
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The Mississippi legislature responded to the problem by utilizing a 
“Wind Pool”—property insurance of last resort for those in need.88 The 
Pool purchases reinsurance from the global market at costly rates, 
requiring 398% and 268% premium increases on residential and 
commercial property policies respectively.89 For a brief period, federal 
bailout money was allocated to help relieve the exorbitant costs of the 
Pool.90 However, this was only a temporary solution,91 and aside from 
sponsoring bills calling for insurance reform and federal regulation,92 it 
remains to be seen how the Gulf Coast states will respond to the threat 
of Katrina-like events in the future. 
Unfortunately, the insurance industry pullout following Katrina was 
unsurprising. The same sequence of events followed Hurricane Andrew 
in Florida in 1993. Both the insurance and reinsurance markets collapsed, 
and many insurers who did not go bankrupt simply abandoned the 
market.93 Thus, the Florida legislature created the Florida Hurricane 
Catastrophe Fund (“FHCF”), which has been successful in some respects 
but is significantly overexposed.94 For example, in 2008, the Florida State 
Senate released a report “indicat[ing] that the FHCF’s potential shortfall 
for 2009—that is, the difference between liquidity resources and 
potential obligations—could be as large as $19 billion.”95 As will be 
explained in greater detail, a prophylactic federal response to 
catastrophe insurance is the ultimate solution under these circumstances. 
 
A1. 
 88. Taylor, supra note 80, at 788–89. 
 89. Id. at 789. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See id. at 789–90 (calling for support for two such bills, including the Insurance Industry 
Competition Act (H.R. 1081) and the Flood Insurance Reform and Modernization Act (H.R. 3121)); 
Homeowners’ Defense Act of 2007, H.R. 3355, 110th Cong. (2007) (modified and reintroduced as 
Homeowners’ Defense Act of 2009, H.R. 2555, 111th Cong. (2009)). 
 93. Adrian Sainz, Ten Years After Hurricane Andrew, Effects Are Still Felt, Sun-Sentinel, Aug. 
18, 2002, at 2, available at http://www.sun-sentinel.com/sfl-1992-ap-mainstory,0,7290462.story. 
 94. See Orszag & Fontaine, supra note 86, at 14–15; Bowers, supra note 2, at 21–22; Obama, 
supra note 86. 
 95. Orszag & Fontaine, supra note 86, at 15 & n.22 (“The FHCF relies on bonding authority as it 
builds up reserves to meet its obligations. The recognized potential shortfall is a product of the current 
economic environment and lack of available capital, combined with an expansion of the FHCF.”); see 
also Obama, supra note 86 (“To shore [the FHCF] up, Floridians—already facing a budget shortfall—
are paying Warren Buffet a quarter of a billion dollars just for the option to borrow money if disaster 
strikes. And even then, the Cat Fund wouldn’t have enough to cover its estimated $28-billion in 
exposure should a major hurricane hit.”). 
Young_62-HLJ-757 (Do Not Delete) 3/4/2011 12:32 PM 
770 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:757 
B. The Efficient Proximate Cause Doctrine in California: 
Has the Golden State Achieved the Perfect Balance? 
In many ways, California has been driving the EPC doctrine 
discussion. As previously discussed, the California courts’ broadening of 
the doctrine did much to foster the uncertainty that led insurers to draft 
ACC policy language in the first place.96 An overview of the pertinent 
California cases and statutes is necessary to understand the progression 
of the doctrine. 
Unlike many other states, the EPC doctrine is actually codified in 
California Insurance Code sections 530 and 532.97 A strict reading of the 
statutory language in each of these sections, however, reveals that they 
seem to conflict with one another. Section 530 reads: 
An insurer is liable for a loss of which a peril insured against was the 
proximate cause, although a peril not contemplated by the contract 
may have been a remote cause of the loss; but he is not liable for a loss 
of which the peril insured against was only a remote cause.98 
By contrast, section 532 dictates that “[i]f a peril is specially excepted in a 
contract of insurance and there is a loss which would not have occurred 
but for such peril, such loss is thereby excepted even though the 
immediate cause of the loss was a peril which was not excepted.”99 The 
“but for” language in section 532 directly conflicts with section 530’s 
notion of proximate cause, because under section 532, a peril would be 
excluded if it were a “but for” cause of the loss, even if the “immediate 
cause” of the loss was a covered peril. Given this confusion, in a case 
involving multiple causes where at least one is covered and one is 
excluded, which should win? 
The California courts faced exactly this question in a series of cases 
beginning with Sabella v. Wisler100 in 1963. In Sabella, the plaintiffs had 
purchased an all-risk homeowner’s insurance policy with National Union 
Fire Insurance Company.101 Their policy excluded “loss . . . by . . . settling, 
cracking, shrinkage, or expansion of pavements, foundations, walls, 
floors, or ceilings; unless loss by . . . collapse of building ensues. . . .”102 
Unfortunately, by 1959, the home had incurred a great deal of 
subsidence damage, sinking over seven inches in one area; although the 
foundations and walls had cracked, the home was left standing and was 
 
 96. See supra Part I.B. 
 97. Cal. Ins. Code §§ 530, 532 (West 2005). 
 98. Id. § 530. 
 99. Id. § 532 (emphasis added). 
 100. 377 P.2d 889 (Cal. 1963). 
 101. Id. at 891. 
 102. Id. at 891–92. 
Young_62-HLJ-757 (Do Not Delete) 3/4/2011 12:32 PM 
February 2011]      EFFICIENT PROXIMATE CAUSE 771 
 
deemed “inhabitable.”103 The trial court estimated the loss of value at 
approximately $8000.104 
At first glance, this appears to be a clear case of subsidence loss 
excluded under the policy; however, the Sabellas argued that under 
section 530, the loss should be covered as the subsidence itself had been 
proximately caused by a leaky sewer pipe, negligently installed by the 
contractor (negligence was covered under the policy).105 The insurer 
responded that under section 532, the loss should be excluded because 
the damage would not have occurred “but for” the settling.106 Attempting 
to reconcile the two sections, the California Supreme Court explained 
that section 532 could not be read in such a way as to nullify section 
530.107 The “but for” language in section 532 necessarily corresponds to 
the proximate cause, so that when the EPC of a loss is excluded under 
the policy, the loss will not be covered.108 The language of “immediate 
cause of the loss” corresponds only to the cause that was “immediate in 
time to the occurrence of the damage.”109 Therefore, the court held, the 
loss must be attributed to the “efficient cause,” the cause that set the 
other events or causes in motion.110 Here, the EPC of the loss was 
determined to be the negligence of the contractor, and coverage 
applied.111 
After Sabella, the California courts hit a stumbling block with State 
Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Partridge.112 Partridge presented a 
very different situation: one involving third-party liability coverage—as 
opposed to first-party property coverage—where two independent 
causes acted concurrently to bring about a single loss. The defendant had 
filed down the trigger on his pistol in order to create a “hair trigger”—
one negligent act—and then had injured a passenger in his car as he 
attempted to shoot jackrabbits from the driver-side window while 
driving—a second, distinct negligent act.113 The court held that under 
third-party liability coverage, where there are concurrent proximate 
causes of a single loss, coverage applies “whenever an insured risk 
constitutes simply a concurrent proximate cause of the injuries.”114 In 
 
 103. Id at 892. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 892, 895. 
 106. Id. at 896. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 896–97. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 895. 
 111. Id. 
 112. 514 P.2d 123 (Cal. 1973). 
 113. Id. at 125–27. 
 114. Id. at 130. 
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other words, the court adopted a concurrent causation approach in place 
of the EPC doctrine for this scenario. Thus, as long as one of the 
concurrent causes of the loss was a covered peril, the entire loss would be 
covered by the policy. 
Inevitably, the insured-friendly ruling began to cause confusion. The 
California appellate courts began to use the Partridge concurrent 
causation analysis instead of Sabella’s EPC analysis in first-party 
property cases in order to grant full coverage where one of the 
concurrent causes of the loss was covered.115 As a result, in 1989, the 
California Supreme Court took up Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Casualty 
Co. to correct the confusion.116 In Garvey, the plaintiffs had moved into a 
home in the mid-seventies and had purchased an all-risk property policy 
from State Farm that excluded loss caused “by . . . settling, cracking, 
shrinkage, bulging or expansion of pavements, patios, foundations, walls, 
floors, roofs or ceilings . . . .”117 A year later, the Garveys discovered 
damage to the walls from an addition that had begun to pull away from 
the home.118 As in Sabella, the Garveys argued that the loss was covered 
because it had been caused by negligence on the part of the contractor 
who built the addition.119 State Farm argued that the loss was caused by 
earth movement and was therefore excluded.120 The trial court, relying on 
Partridge, held that because negligence was a concurrent proximate 
cause of the loss, the Garveys were entitled to a directed verdict on that 
issue.121 
Again applying sections 530 and 532, the California Supreme Court 
reversed, holding that the Partridge analysis was inappropriate for first-
party property coverage cases and should only be applied in third-party 
liability coverage cases.122 The court pointed out that “because a covered 
peril usually can be asserted to exist somewhere in the chain of causation 
in cases involving multiple causes, applying the Partridge approach to 
coverage in first-party cases effectively nullifies policy exclusions in ‘all 
risk’ homeowner’s property loss policies.”123 Instead, Sabella’s EPC 
 
 115. E.g., Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Adams, 216 Cal. Rptr. 287, 294 (Ct. App. 1985); Premier Ins. Co. v. 
Welch, 189 Cal. Rptr. 657, 662 (Ct. App. 1983); see Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Guyton, 692 F.2d 551, 
554–55 (9th Cir. 1982) (applying Partridge to find that the insured’s loss was covered because third-
party negligence was a cause of the loss, despite also finding that the EPC of the loss was flooding, an 
excluded cause under the policy); see also Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 P.2d 704, 704–05 
(Cal. 1989). 
 116. 770 P.2d at 704–05. 
 117. Id. at 705. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 706. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 705. 
 123. Id. 
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analysis is appropriate for first-party property cases.124 Furthermore, the 
EPC is the “predominating” cause, not necessarily the “triggering” cause 
of the loss.125 The Garvey court did, however, leave open the possibility 
of a Partridge-like concurrent causation analysis that might apply to first-
party property losses in the event that two truly independent causes 
simultaneously produce an indivisible loss, such as in the earthquake and 
airplane crash example; in such a case, a Sabella analysis may not be 
helpful as it may be impossible to tell which was the EPC.126 But the 
Garvey facts presented a “classic Sabella situation,” and the question 
whether negligence or earth movement was the EPC was a matter for a 
jury to decide.127 
1. The Current State of Garvey and Anti-Concurrent Clauses 
From the foregoing, it appears that California courts have 
developed bright-line rules applicable to the causation question. If the 
case involves third-party liability coverage, concurrent causation analysis 
applies. If it involves first-party property coverage, EPC analysis 
generally applies. But these rules fostered concern within the insurance 
industry. Cases such as Sabella, Safeco Insurance Co. v. Motte,128 Safeco 
Insurance Co. of America v. Guyton,129 and Premier Insurance Co. v. 
Welch,130 among others, represented a trend toward allowing coverage 
based on negligence for losses that seemed excluded by the contractual 
terms of the policy.131 It is easy to imagine a scenario in which any loss 
might be attributed to some negligence or human error. Thus, these cases 
created what was considered to be a new and unanticipated cause of loss, 
making it much more difficult for insurers to control the scope of 
coverage through contractual terms alone.132 
As a result, the industry launched a two-pronged attack on the 
courts’ expansive reading of the EPC doctrine. They lobbied the 
California legislature for relief, particularly in the area of earthquake 
insurance,133 and attempted to add restrictive ACC language to their 
 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 708. 
 126. Id. at 713 n.9. 
 127. Id. at 714–15. 
 128. No. 0298082-9 (Fresno County Cal. Super. Ct. July 1984). 
 129. 692 F.2d 551, 554–55 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding that coverage applied on a negligence theory, 
and that the lower court had misapplied the causation analysis in a case where insureds’ property had 
been damaged by rain, an excluded cause). 
 130. 189 Cal. Rptr. 657, 662 (Ct. App. 1983) (applying Partridge to find coverage based on 
negligence where the insureds’ home had been damaged by rain, an excluded cause). 
 131. Bragg, supra note 14, at 389–91, 393. 
 132. Id. at 391, 393. 
 133. See infra text accompanying notes 196–99. 
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policies.134 These alterations limited recovery by squeezing negligence-
related causes out of the picture and creating exclusions—particularly for 
different types of catastrophic loss—to deny coverage where the loss 
would not have occurred but for the excluded peril.135 However, the 
ultimate success or failure of these measures is still up for debate in 
California. 
Although the California Supreme Court has never expressly ruled 
on the issue,136 many commentators have simply taken for granted that 
ACC clauses are unenforceable in California, since the courts’ 
interpretation of Insurance Code sections 530 and 532 suggests that the 
EPC doctrine is not susceptible to alteration by contractual terms.137 
Ultimately, this conclusion may stem from the fact that historically, 
California decisions and policy choices have often been pro-insured.138 
Before we examine why ACC clauses may actually be permitted under 
certain circumstances, we must first look at the cases undermining their 
enforceability. 
First, prior to the decision in Garvey, the Fresno County Superior 
Court refused to enforce ACC language in Safeco Insurance Co. v. Motte, 
a coverage case involving earthquake damage.139 The court held that the 
ACC language was invalid because the policyholders were not 
sufficiently informed, and that although “earthquake” was a specifically 
excluded cause of loss, tectonic plate slippage (the actual cause of the 
earthquake event) was not expressly excluded.140 In any event, the court 
found, negligent design was a concurrent cause of the loss and thus, 
coverage applied.141 Safeco decided not to pursue the issue at the time, 
but the industry pushed back, attempting to strengthen the ACC clauses 
in their policies.142 
 
 134. Bragg, supra note 14, at 393–94. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Scott G. Johnson, The Efficient Proximate Cause Doctrine in California: Ten Years After 
Garvey, J. Ins. Coverage, Autumn 1999, at 1, 13. 
 137. See, e.g., Lavitt, supra note 14, at 17; Phillips & Coplen, supra note 8, at 35 tbl. 1; Passa, supra 
note 8, at 572; Johnson, supra note 136, at 13. 
 138. Some suggest that one of the goals of California’s method of “causation analysis may be its 
demonstrated passion to find ways to compensate injured parties even at the expense of breaking 
down common law distinctions between tort and contract.” Bragg, supra note 14, at 388. Examples of 
more insured-friendly policies include California’s application of the doctrine of contra proferentem, 
the rule that ambiguities in a contract are to be interpreted against the drafter, as well as the doctrine 
of reasonable expectations. See, e.g., AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 799 P.2d 1253, 1264 (Cal. 1990). 
 139. Rossmiller, supra note 1, at 60 (citing No. 0298082-9 (Fresno County Cal. Super. Ct. July 
1984)). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Bragg, supra note 14, at 390–91. 
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In Safeco Insurance Co. v. Guyton, Safeco litigated a flood insurance 
coverage issue.143 The water district had not taken sufficient measures to 
stop flooding from heavy rains. The policy read: “This policy does not 
insure against loss: . . . 1. caused by, resulting from, contributed to or 
aggravated by any of the following: a. flood, surface water, waves . . . .”144 
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit, relying on Partridge, held that this 
exclusion was insufficient to bar coverage if negligence was also a 
proximate cause of the loss.145 
These two cases were decided prior to Garvey. Although they 
demonstrate disfavor for insurers’ attempts to draft policies around 
concurrent causation, Garvey changed the game by barring the 
concurrent causation analysis from first-party property insurance 
coverage cases, while leaving open the question of whether ACC clauses 
would be enforceable in the future.146 Thereafter, in Howell v. State Farm 
Fire & Casualty Co., decided post-Garvey in 1990, an appellate court 
suggested that the California courts would refuse to enforce them.147 
In Howell, the plaintiff owned a home, three rental units, and a dog 
kennel, all of which were insured by State Farm under various policies.148 
Unfortunately, Howell’s property was located on a slope susceptible to 
landslides, and a fire had destroyed much of the protective vegetation 
nearby, making the slope more vulnerable.149 The following winter, the 
slope failed during heavy rainfall, and a major landslide occurred, 
destroying much of her property.150 State Farm denied coverage, claiming 
that the loss was not the result of landslide but of earth movement and 
water damage, neither of which were covered.151 
The exclusions sections of Howell’s policies included the following 
ACC language: 
We do not insure under any coverage for loss (including collapse of an 
insured building or part of a building) which would not have occurred 
in the absence of one or more of the following excluded events. We do 
not insure for such loss regardless of: a) the cause of the excluded 
event; or b) other causes of the loss; or c) whether other causes acted 
concurrently or in any sequence with the excluded event to produce 
the loss . . . .152 
 
 143. 692 F.2d 551, 552 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 144. Id. at 552–53 (emphasis omitted). 
 145. Id. at 554–55. 
 146. See supra text accompanying notes 115–27. 
 147. 267 Cal. Rptr. 708, 715–16 (Ct. App. 1990).  
 148. Id. at 709. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 709–10. 
 152. Id. at 710. 
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Earth movement and water damage were among the excluded perils.153 
Citing sections 530 and 532, Sabella, and Garvey, the court held the ACC 
clause unenforceable, stating that an “insurer may not limit its liability in 
this manner, since the statutory and judicial law of this state make the 
insurer liable whenever a covered peril is the ‘efficient proximate cause’ 
of the loss, regardless of other contributing causes.”154 The court 
explained that “if we were to give full effect to the . . . policy language 
excluding coverage whenever an excluded peril is a contributing or 
aggravating factor in the loss, we would be giving insurance companies 
carte blanche to deny coverage in nearly all cases.”155 
From this, it may appear that California has a tight grip on the EPC 
doctrine, and that ACC clause alteration of the doctrine is impermissible. 
Without a definitive California Supreme Court ruling, we cannot be 
certain. But even if we assume that California is one of the few states 
refusing to apply ACC clauses, its hold seems to be slipping. A pair of 
recent cases, Julian v. Hartford Underwriters Insurance Co.156 and 
Freedman v. State Farm Insurance Co.,157 reveal a developing slippery slope 
of exceptions to the EPC rules. In Julian, the plaintiffs’ home had been 
located just under a slope that failed after heavy rainfall, which caused a 
tree to fall on the house.158 The Julians’ home had been insured by 
Hartford under a general homeowner’s all-risk policy.159 Among the 
exclusions in the policy were the following clauses: 
1. We do not insure against loss caused directly or indirectly by any of 
the following. Such loss is excluded regardless of any other cause or 
event contributing concurrently or in any sequence to the loss: . . . 
b. Earth Movement, meaning . . . landslide . . . . 
c. Water Damage . . . . 
2. We do not insure against loss to property . . . caused by any of the 
following. However, any ensuing loss to property . . . not excluded or 
excepted in this policy is covered. 
a. Weather conditions. However, this exclusion only applies if 
weather conditions contribute in any way with a cause or event 
excluded in paragraph 1. above to produce the loss . . . .160 
Certain “acts, errors or omissions in design or construction” were also 
excluded under the policy.161 Hartford denied coverage on the theory that 
no possible EPC could be covered under the circumstances, as the policy 
 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 711–12. 
 155. Id. at 715 n.6. 
 156. 110 P.3d 903 (Cal. 2005). 
 157. 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d 296 (Ct. App. 2009). 
 158. Julian, 110 P.3d at 905. 
 159. Id. at 905 n.2.  
 160. Id. at 905 (emphasis added). 
 161. Id. 
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excluded earth movement, third-party negligence, and “weather 
conditions” if they “contribute in any way with” another excluded peril, 
in this case, landslide.162 The Julians argued, on the contrary, that the 
EPC was either negligence, weather conditions alone, or collapse 
unrelated to flood, none of which were effectively excluded.163 Tellingly, 
the California Supreme Court framed the issue as whether section 530 
and the EPC doctrine “inflexibly” prohibit insurers from excluding some 
weather conditions and not others.164 
While giving credence to Garvey, Howell, and the notion that 
insurers should not be permitted to employ sweeping policy terms to 
contract around the EPC doctrine or to render the insured’s coverage 
“virtually illusory,”165 the court nevertheless found the “weather 
conditions” clause to be an enforceable exclusion, because perils may be 
defined “in terms of a relationship between two otherwise distinct 
perils.”166 This reasoning effectively creates an escape clause to the EPC 
doctrine. Since the doctrine is only implicated when multiple perils cause 
a single loss,167 permitting insurers to manufacture a single peril out of the 
relationship between two distinct perils allows them to circumvent the 
doctrine. 
The court likened the exclusion to a policy that covers weather 
conditions generally but excludes specific weather conditions such as 
rain, hail, or wind, and justified enforcing the exclusion by virtue of the 
insured’s reasonable expectations.168 Relying heavily on the insurer’s 
engineering report stating that landslides of the type involved are 
“always” caused by water, the court explained that a reasonable insured 
would understand the term “contribute in any way with” in this 
particular policy to exclude rain contributing to landslide.169 But this 
rationale is problematic. At the outset, it may very well be that on this 
particular property, if the policy had named “rain” in combination with 
other excluded perils, a reasonable insured should have interpreted the 
clause to exclude landslide caused by rain. But the insurer, instead, chose 
the overbroad terms “weather conditions” and “contributing in any way 
with” to effectuate its intent. Whether there is sufficient difference in 
clarity between these terms and the terms used in Howell170 for a 
reasonable insured to be expected to anticipate this exclusion is 
 
 162. Id. at 906. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 910. 
 165. Id. at 908. 
 166. Id. at 911. 
 167. See 7 Russ & Segalla, supra note 9, § 101:55. 
 168. Julian, 110 P.3d at 911–12. 
 169. Id. 
 170. See supra text accompanying notes 152–54. 
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debatable. More importantly, the court’s rationale is troubling, because 
the exclusion does not seem sufficiently narrow to avoid the “illusory” 
coverage problems condemned in Howell. 
As United Policyholders pointed out in an amicus brief, reading the 
clauses literally meant that if the Julians’ loss had been caused ninety-
nine percent by a weather condition and one percent by a negligible 
amount of earth movement or water, then it would not have been 
covered.171 This is the exact result that Garvey, Howell, and the EPC 
doctrine attempt to avoid. Even the Julian court recognized this, stating 
that the use of the phrase “contribute in any way with” to link landslides 
with weather conditions “seems particularly designed to circumvent the 
efficient proximate cause doctrine.”172 In its opinion, the court warns that 
a case resembling United Policyholders’s hypothetical would “raise 
troubling questions regarding the clause’s consistency with the efficient 
proximate cause doctrine. Denial of coverage for such a loss would 
suggest the provision of illusory insurance against weather conditions.”173 
As a result, the court limited its holding to the specific facts (rain and 
landslide), again relying heavily on the engineer’s report that landslide in 
these cases is “always” caused by water.174 
Julian seemed to be an isolated event at first. In fact, a few years 
later, an appellate court decided De Bruyn v. Superior Court.175 There, 
the court noted that Julian was limited to its facts and refused to allow an 
insurer to claim that under Julian, insurers may exclude particular perils 
“however caused,” without reference to the EPC doctrine.176 The court, 
however, proceeded to apply Julian’s reasoning that an insurer may 
cover certain forms of a peril and exclude other forms of the same 
peril.177 Interestingly, the facts in De Bruyn create a case where such 
reasoning can be more soundly applied than did the facts in Julian itself. 
In De Bruyn, the homeowners returned from vacation to discover water 
and mold damage caused by an overflowed toilet.178 After review, their 
insurer agreed to cover the water damage from the overflow, but refused 
to cover any mold damage.179 The homeowner’s policy generally excluded 
water damage but expressly included water damage from “sudden and 
accidental discharge or overflow of water from within a 
plumbing . . . system.”180 This inclusion was itself expressly limited by a 
 
 171. Julian, 110 P.3d at 911. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 911–12. 
 175. 70 Cal. Rptr. 3d 652 (Ct. App. 2008). 
 176. Id. at 658–59. 
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clause stating that mold would not be covered under any 
circumstances.181 
Under these circumstances, basing a decision on the reasonable 
expectations of the insured—as the Julian court did—is relatively 
unremarkable. The problem with the holding in Julian is not that it is 
unreasonable to allow insurers to cover certain forms of a peril and 
exclude other forms, but that insurers should not be permitted to 
combine perils to circumvent the EPC doctrine or to effectuate “illusory” 
coverage when they do so. In De Bruyn, the insurer covered some forms 
of water damage and not others; there was no “combined” peril. They 
did not use the mold exclusion to enable them to deny the whole claim, 
just the portion of the damage caused by mold. Therefore, coverage was 
not rendered illusory. As such, De Bruyn is a good example of how a 
policy covering only certain forms of a peril might be applied fairly, 
meeting the reasonable expectations of the insured. 
While it seemed that Julian had been successfully limited to its facts, 
the court muddied the waters in 2009 when it decided Freedman v. State 
Farm Insurance Co.182 In Freedman, a contractor remodeling the 
Freedmans’ bathroom had unknowingly driven a nail through a pipe.183 
The nail caused no leakage at first, but years later, it corroded and water 
began to leak slowly, causing extensive water damage.184 State Farm 
denied the entire claim.185 Under the homeowner’s policy, water damage 
caused by rust was excluded from coverage.186 Along with this, the 
following “combined peril” clauses were added: 
We do not insure for loss described in [the exclusions paragraphs] 
regardless of whether one or more of the following: (a) directly or 
indirectly cause, contribute to or aggravate the loss; or (b) occur 
before, at the same time, or after the loss or any other cause of the loss: 
a. conduct, act, failure to act, or decision of any person, group, 
organization or governmental body whether intentional, wrongful, 
negligent, or without fault;  
b. defect, weakness, inadequacy, fault or unsoundness in: . . . 
(2) design, specifications, workmanship, construction, grading, 
compaction . . . .187 
While the Freedmans claimed the EPC of their loss was the contractor’s 
negligence, State Farm contended that the EPC was irrelevant as third-
 
 181. Id. 
 182. 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d 296 (Ct. App. 2009), rev. denied (2009). 
 183. Id. at 299. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 298–99. 
 187. Id. at 299. 
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party negligence was excluded under the policy whenever it combined 
with other excluded perils (in this case, water damage).188 
 The Freedman court, relying on Julian, upheld the exclusion.189 
Without a single mention of the Julian court’s warnings regarding the 
EPC doctrine or the limitation of Julian to its facts, the Freedman court 
agreed with State Farm, explaining that third-party negligence was 
excluded under the policy whenever it combined with water damage.190 
The court also rejected without discussion the Freedmans’ argument that 
the negligence exclusion was not sufficiently clear.191 Here we can see the 
danger in Julian’s holding. Presumably, if the Freedmans’ loss had been 
ninety-nine percent the result of third-party negligence combined with 
some slight water damage, the Freedmans would be left without 
coverage. More importantly, unlike the evidence in Julian that the type 
of landslide at issue was “always” caused by water, there was no such 
evidence in Freedman linking negligence and pipe leakage. Thus, the 
appellate court seems to have expanded Julian’s scope and given insurers 
license to combine any set of perils, thereby eluding the EPC doctrine. 
This slope is poised to fail. 
Julian and its progeny throw the certainty of California’s grasp on 
the EPC doctrine into doubt. While “combined peril” clauses are not 
classic ACC clauses, this new strategy of creating a single peril out of the 
relationship between two distinct perils accomplishes a similar goal. The 
purpose of ACC clauses is to circumvent the EPC doctrine.192 While the 
“combined peril” language is less all-encompassing than the typical “but 
for” ACC clause, broad terms such as “weather conditions” come close 
to the line and effectively avoid the EPC doctrine. Take Freedman for 
example: Insurers had been concerned about the courts’ twenty-five-year 
trend of allowing coverage for negligence for a loss that seemed to be 
excluded by the express provisions in their policies.193 By fashioning a 
single excluded peril that arises only when negligence combines with a 
another distinct excluded peril, insurers achieve two things: first, they are 
able to circumvent the EPC doctrine on that issue; second, they eschew 
the loss in premiums that would necessarily result if they were to exclude 
negligence altogether. In other words, they get to have their cake and eat 
it too. 
Even if we were not as concerned with “combined peril” exclusions 
as we are with ACC clauses, it seems apparent from the Julian line of 
cases that at the very least, the EPC doctrine is not impermeable in 
 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 301. 
 190. Id. 
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 192. See Rossmiller, supra note 1, at 46. 
 193. Bragg, supra note 14, at 389–91, 393. 
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California. We have no crystal ball to tell us how the courts will apply 
Julian in the future, or to what number and breadth of factual scenarios 
and combinations of perils these clauses will be applied. Insurers will 
have to guess how far they can push the envelope. Insureds will be forced 
to guess which “weather conditions” are most likely to exacerbate other 
exclusions in their policies and whether negligence is likely to be a factor, 
all while paying premiums that reflect coverage for these classes of perils 
generally. Unfortunately, it is exactly this sort of uncertainty that can 
make application of the EPC doctrine so troublesome.194 
2. The Earthquake Problem 
Not only have insurers won ground on the judicial front in their 
efforts to avoid the EPC doctrine, but they have also won significant 
ground on the legislative front. Despite the addition of ACC clause 
limitations to homeowner’s policies, insurers still feared that because 
previous causation decisions—Sabella and its kin—were couched in 
terms of Insurance Code sections 530 and 532, courts might ultimately 
determine that the EPC analysis was so entrenched that they could not 
permit insurers to “contract around” it without legislative consent, either 
implicit or express.195 Thus, the insurance industry launched the second 
prong of its attack, lobbying the California legislature for protection, 
particularly from earthquake-related damage.196 Several years and 
rejected bills later, the industry succeeded in having Assembly Bill 
2865,197 enacted in 1984, shortly before Garvey.198 The new sections 
created an express exemption for earthquake loss from the EPC analysis. 
Section 10088 states, in part: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 530, 532, or any other 
provision of law, and in the absence of an endorsement or an 
additional policy provision specifically covering the peril of 
earthquake, no policy which by its terms does not cover the peril of 
earthquake shall provide or shall be held to provide coverage for any 
loss or damage when earthquake is a proximate cause regardless of 
whether the loss or damage also directly or indirectly results from, or is 
contributed to, concurrently or in any sequence by any other proximate 
or remote cause, whether or not covered by the policy.199 
Section 10088.5 adds that section 10088 does not “exempt[] an insurer 
from its obligation under a fire insurance policy to cover losses of a fire 
 
 194. See supra notes 46–47, 78 and accompanying text. 
 195. See Bragg, supra note 14, at 398. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Assemb. B. 2865, 1983–84 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1984) (codified at Cal. Ins. Code §§ 10081–
10089.4 (West 2005)). 
 198. Bragg, supra note 14, at 398. 
 199. Ins. § 10088. 
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which is caused by or follows an earthquake.”200 Thus, any cause of loss 
other than fire, such as negligent construction, explosion, flooding, and 
the like, will not be covered if they occur in a situation in which an 
earthquake can be considered one proximate cause of the damage. In 
effect, section 10088 functions as a sort of legislatively-mandated ACC 
clause tailored to earthquake loss; unless a separate earthquake policy is 
in place, an earthquake will be considered the proximate cause and the 
loss will not be covered, regardless of any other covered, concurrent 
causes.201 Note that this also applies to loss for which aftershocks are a 
proximate cause.202 
But with this exemption, the insurance industry took the bitter as 
well as the sweet. In exchange for the causation concession, insurers 
became required to offer earthquake coverage along with any residential 
property insurance coverage.203 The insurer can make the coverage offer 
directly or arrange for it to be made by a third-party insurer, but the 
statute requires a particular written format and an explanation to 
policyholders that they will not be covered for any earthquake damage 
under their policy without purchasing separate earthquake coverage.204 
The intent behind these provisions was certainly to protect insurance 
companies from insolvency following a major earthquake event—but it 
was also to encourage California homeowners to purchase adequate 
earthquake coverage and to ensure such coverage would be available.205 
This bill seemed the perfect solution to the earthquake insurance 
problem until the Northridge earthquake hit in 1994 and caused over $12 
billion in insurance losses.206 Scientists had been unaware that a fault line 
existed in the area until the earthquake hit, illustrating another difficulty 
in anticipating earthquakes and implementing coverage, even in California 
where earthquakes are widely understood to be a threat.207 Similar to the 
 
 200. Id. § 10088.5. 
 201. See Consumers: Earthquake Insurance, Cal. Dep’t of Ins., http://www.insurance.ca.gov/ 
0100-consumers/0060-information-guides/0040-residential/earthquake-insurance.cfm (last visited Feb. 
2, 2011) (explaining that under section 10088, earthquake will be considered the proximate cause of a 
loss regardless of any other causes that might be covered under the homeowner’s property insurance). 
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 203. Ins. § 10081 (requiring insurers issuing new or renewed residential property insurance policies 
to offer earthquake coverage also, either provided in the residential property policy itself or in a 
separate policy); see also Bragg, supra note 14, at 398. The minimum amount is set forth in 
section 10089. Ins. § 10089. 
 204. See generally Ins. §§ 10081–10089.4 (laying out the various formal requirements for offers of 
earthquake insurance). 
 205. See e.g., Jacobellis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 120 F.3d 171, 173–74 (9th Cir. 1997); Marina 
Green Homeowners Ass’n v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364, 367 (Ct. App. 1994); 
Williams v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 265 Cal. Rptr. 644, 646–47 (Ct. App. 1990); Bragg, supra note 
14, at 398. 
 206. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 62; Rawle O. King, Cong. Research Serv., RL 32847, 
Tsunamis and Earthquakes: Is Federal Disaster Insurance in Our Future? 14 (2005). 
 207. Ericson & Doyle, supra note 29, at 187. 
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response following Hurricanes Andrew and Katrina, after the 1994 
Northridge earthquake, the insurance industry fled the scene, greatly 
restricted homeowner’s insurance policy sales in California, and in some 
cases, refused to sell any new homeowner’s policies.208 Some insurers 
went so far as to engage in fraud in order to avoid coverage.209 Much like 
Florida had done in the wake of Hurricane Andrew, California 
established the California Earthquake Authority (“CEA”) to combat the 
problem.210 While the response was similar, the CEA’s structure is 
significantly different from that of the FHCF. 
The CEA is a publicly-managed but largely privately-funded 
organization designed to oversee and administer earthquake “mini” or 
add-on policies, which participating insurance companies may offer in 
order to satisfy the requirement imposed by section 10081.211 For a 
service charge, participating insurers offer the mini-policies, manage the 
details, and accept all premiums from the insureds on behalf of the 
CEA.212 Of course, insureds are not required to accept the offer of 
earthquake coverage, but when they do, the mini-policies provide 
skeletal coverage protecting only their dwellings, not outside structures 
such as swimming pools and patios, from earthquake shake loss.213 
Presumably, damage caused by any ensuing fire, explosion, or water 
damage (non-shake loss) would then be covered under standard 
homeowner’s insurance policies.214 The CEA is currently reported to be 
in good financial health with a claims-paying capacity of approximately 
$9.8 billion.215 
But financial health is, unfortunately, not always an accurate 
measure of success. While the CEA is sound enough to withstand a 250-
year earthquake event, to date, only twelve-to-thirteen percent of 
California homeowners have actually purchased earthquake insurance.216 
The scientific community agrees that a 6.7 magnitude earthquake is 
 
 208. Hearings, supra note 2, at 62; King, supra note 206, at 14. 
 209. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 834, 841–42 (Ct. App. 
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 212. Id. at 63. 
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guaranteed to occur somewhere in California in the next thirty years.217 
Illustrating the danger, a 7.2 magnitude earthquake, the worst the area 
has seen since 1892, struck Baja California, Mexico on April 4, 2010,218 
causing what experts estimate should not exceed $1 billion total in 
damage, with $300 million in insured losses.219 Fortunately for California, 
it was not at the epicenter of the quake, and most of the momentum 
progressed northwest.220 But the state will not always be so lucky. In fact, 
most Californians live within twenty miles of a fault line.221 This means 
that in the wake of a major earthquake event, California homeowners 
may suffer unprecedented (and uncovered) loss, despite the CEA’s 
existence. Prior to the Baja California event, Glenn Pomeroy, the Chief 
Executive Officer of the CEA, gave the following example to 
demonstrate the problem: Following a 7.2 magnitude earthquake striking 
the peninsular region on the San Andreas Fault, which leads up through 
San Francisco, homeowners could suffer over $55.1 billion in losses, but 
at the current rate, only $4.1 billion would actually be covered.222 This is 
despite the fact that the CEA has the capacity to pay up to $9.8 billion.223 
Why are so many California homeowners uninsured despite the 
likelihood of a quake, the availability of CEA policies, and the 
requirement that they be offered (and reoffered) earthquake insurance? 
Simply put, coverage is still too expensive.224 Particularly in high-risk 
areas, earthquake insurance policies can cost more, alone, than the rate 
of basic homeowner’s and fire insurance.225 On top of that, most policies 
require a fifteen percent deductible, meaning that a home would need to 
suffer a great deal of loss before the insured sees a dime from the 
insurance company.226 For many the benefits simply do not outweigh the 
costs.227 
Why are the CEA policies so expensive? Mr. Pomeroy explains that 
the high cost results from the fact that the CEA’s own “reinsurance costs 
are simply massive.”228 The CEA depends upon reinsurance for much of 
its claim-paying capacity.229 At this point, approximately forty percent of 
 
 217. Hearings, supra note 2, at 64. 
 218. Magnitude 7.2—Baja California, Mexico, USGS (Apr. 4, 2010), http://earthquake.usgs.gov/ 
earthquakes/recenteqsww/Quakes/ci14607652.php#summary. 
 219. Experts Estimate $300 Million in Losses from Mexico Earthquake, Ins. J. (Apr. 6, 2010), 
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/west/2010/04/06/108788.htm. 
 220. USGS, supra note 218. 
 221. Hearings, supra note 2, at 64. 
 222. Id. at 65. 
 223. Id. at 64. 
 224. Id. at 65; King, supra note 206, at 14. 
 225. Hearings, supra note 2, at 65. 
 226. Id.; see Bowers, supra note 2, at 23. 
 227. Hearings, supra note 2, at 65. 
 228. Id. at 66. 
 229. Id. 
Young_62-HLJ-757 (Do Not Delete) 3/4/2011 12:32 PM 
February 2011]      EFFICIENT PROXIMATE CAUSE 785 
 
the CEA’s premium revenue goes to paying the high cost of reinsurance 
in the global market, and reinsurers have paid back only $250,000 in 
claims over the past thirteen years.230 Essentially, the CEA is forced to 
spend forty percent of its premium revenue each year for reinsurance 
coverage for a mega-catastrophe (defined as a 545-year earthquake 
event) that is highly unlikely to occur.231 Worse still, in 2010, the price of 
the CEA’s reinsurance contracts rose further by fifteen percent and will 
only continue to rise.232 As premiums go up, it is safe to assume that the 
number of homeowners who chose to purchase insurance will only drop. 
3. California’s Approach to Causation and Catastrophe Insurance 
Is on Shaky Ground 
California’s approach, combining the bright-line Garvey rules for 
EPC analysis with the earthquake exception and the CEA, presents an 
example of one workable framework that other states, such as those in 
the Gulf Coast, might follow to resolve the uncertainty of causation 
analysis and catastrophe coverage. Theoretically, a codified EPC analysis 
should remove much uncertainty as to when it will be applied or whether 
it may be contracted around. The earthquake exception and the CEA 
then relieve the insurance industry of one of the EPC doctrine’s failings: 
the possibility that the industry might be hit with unanticipated claims 
after a major catastrophe. 
But, of course, that is only in theory. Based on the foregoing, the 
solution is far from trustworthy as it stands. Cases such as Julian and 
Freedman demonstrate that insurers have been able to effectively 
contract around the EPC doctrine, despite Garvey. Moreover, the 
current earthquake insurance regime is insufficient to protect against a 
major earthquake event. Barely twelve-to-thirteen percent of 
Californians have actually purchased earthquake coverage for their 
homes.233 At this rate, California homeowners could end up in the same 
position as Katrina victims: with unprecedented loss and only the hope of 
an ad hoc federal bailout to rescue them following a major earthquake 
event. In short, California—and other states wishing to follow 
California’s example—needs to plug up the leaks. 
Part II of this Note has examined the state of the EPC doctrine and 
the role of ACC language in post-Katrina litigation. It has also revealed 
the uncertainty plaguing the California model, both with regards to the 
EPC doctrine, as well as to gaps in earthquake coverage. Part III of this 
Note will suggest a two-tiered solution, recommending that the 
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California courts limit Julian’s effect on the judicial level, and that 
Congress enact the Homeowners’ Defense Act on the legislative level. 
III.  The California Approach Revisited: A Two-Tiered Solution 
As we have seen, the causation problem is intricate: First, the EPC 
doctrine has been applied haphazardly, leading to uncertainty for insured 
and insurer alike. Second, refusing to give force to insurers’ attempts to 
“contract around” the doctrine can lead to justifiable concerns on the 
part of insurers regarding catastrophic loss. Third, catastrophic events 
tend to lead to a mass exodus of insurers, leaving little homeowner’s 
insurance to be found. A brief side-by-side comparison of California and 
Florida, two states that have implemented state-managed disaster relief 
programs, will demonstrate the mechanisms states have employed to 
combat these problems. 
In California, the EPC doctrine is codified, and until recently, the 
courts seemed disinclined to allow insurers to contract around it. In order 
to quell the insurance industry’s fears regarding earthquake coverage, 
the California legislature statutorily barred earthquake damage from the 
EPC analysis. Following the 1994 Northridge earthquake, California 
created the CEA to increase the availability of earthquake insurance and 
to entice insurers to return. Unfortunately, since only twelve-to-thirteen 
percent of California homeowners are currently covered, the CEA’s 
financial health is essentially moot. 
 Compare this to the Floridian response: The Florida courts have 
substituted a concurrent causation analysis in place of the EPC 
doctrine.234 Following Hurricane Andrew, Florida created the FHCF in 
order to induce insurers to return to the Florida market.235 Unlike the 
CEA, which requires insureds to purchase a separate “mini-policy” to 
cover earthquake loss, the FHCF incorporates its wind/water protection 
into the body of standard homeowner’s policies.236 Unfortunately, 
however, the FHCF is seriously financially overextended.237 
The benefit of the Floridian concurrent causation model is that 
results are much easier to anticipate in the average case.238 Where there 
are two “but for” causes, one of which is not covered and one of which is 
covered, coverage applies.239 However, under Garvey’s application of 
Insurance Code sections 530 and 532, it is unlikely that the California 
courts will adopt the Floridian model unless the legislature amends those 
sections. More importantly, applying a concurrent causation analysis to 
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first-party property coverage seems to tip the scale too far to the 
insureds’ side, as it may essentially nullify all the exclusions in a policy.240 
On the catastrophic-loss front, the FHCF and the CEA seem to be 
equally flawed, equally unsound. So how should California prepare itself 
for the inevitable “big one”? The following proposal incorporates both a 
judicial as well as legislative response. 
A. A Judicial Response 
First, at the judicial level, the California courts need to seal the gap 
left by Julian. As commentators have noted, inconsistency in the 
application of causation analyses in insurance cases imposes significant 
costs on the court, insurer, and insured.241 In fact, the California courts 
have been accused of fluctuating between three different doctrinal 
approaches to causation within the last thirty years.242 But the doctrinal 
shifts inherent in the Sabella, Partridge, and Garvey cases can be 
attributed to a need to differentiate between two distinct types of 
insurance: first-party property and third-party liability insurance. 
Additionally, the shift inherent in the court’s decision in Julian seems to 
have been unintentional; indeed, the court held Julian to be limited to its 
facts.243 Accordingly, while the logic in Julian that an insurer should be 
able to cover certain forms of a peril and not other forms is capable of 
being properly applied, as evidenced in De Bruyn,244 the California courts 
should reestablish that Julian is not to be employed to create another 
costly shift in policy. Insurers should not be permitted to paralyze the 
EPC doctrine by turning two distinct perils into a single peril, or to effect 
“illusory” coverage. 
Commentators have argued that the EPC approach creates 
uncertainty above and beyond doctrinal fluctuations, insofar as the 
outcomes of individual cases are unpredictable.245 And courts have only 
complicated the issue by inconsistently applying ACC clauses.246 As a 
result, some commentators have thrown up their hands, arguing for a 
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complete abandonment of the EPC doctrine.247 But there is a much less 
drastic solution. It would be naïve to hope there will ever be a causation 
analysis that solves all outcome inconsistency problems. But we may 
attempt to avoid those inconsistencies that are the most troublesome. 
Inconsistency becomes particularly problematic when dealing with 
mega-catastrophes like earthquakes and hurricanes.248 California’s 
approach can function as a practical solution that is both workable and 
fair. By codifying the EPC doctrine and refusing to allow insurers to 
contract around it, much inconsistency can be eliminated. Statutorily 
exempting catastrophic loss such as earthquakes from this rule both 
reassures insurers and simultaneously encourages insureds to take steps 
to protect themselves. But the benefits of the California system are lost if 
insurers are permitted to take incremental swipes at the EPC doctrine. 
The courts, therefore, should minimize the costly effects of inconsistency 
by restricting Julian’s reach and reasserting the primacy of the doctrine. 
B. A Legislative Response 
In order for the California approach to be most effective, a 
legislative response is also necessary to prepare the state for an 
impending natural catastrophe. Unfortunately, history has shown that 
the private insurance market will not, or cannot, insure against the 
significant catastrophic risk that many states face249—at least not at a cost 
homeowners can afford.250 Too few homeowners are willing to purchase 
earthquake insurance, instead choosing to rely on luck and ad hoc 
federal disaster relief efforts.251 Legislators have frequently called for the 
creation of a federal disaster insurance program to off-set the 
shortcomings of the private market, but Congress has generally 
declined.252 
The National Flood Insurance Program (“NFIP”) is one outlier. 
NFIP is a federal disaster insurance program created to provide flood 
insurance in exchange for an agreement by participating communities to 
 
 247. See, e.g., id. (arguing for the application of “apportionment” and “liberal” approaches to 
causation, following a more rigorous categorization of the involvement of each cause in a loss); Lavitt, 
supra note 14, at 47–63 (arguing for the repurposing of tort law principles, as announced in the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts, to apply to four paradigmatic insurance causation scenarios). 
 248. See Knutsen, supra note 78, at 991–92, 1022. 
 249. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 2, at 10; King, supra note 206, at 12; Orszag & Fontaine, supra 
note 86, at 10. See generally Ericson & Doyle, supra note 29, at 184–211 (providing an in-depth 
discussion of this problem, and tracing the uncertainty of earthquakes and the insurance industry’s 
failure, to date, to provide adequate coverage, even to the point that some insurers provide far more 
coverage than they can actually support in the event of a large earthquake). 
 250. Hearings, supra note 2, at 12; King, supra note 206, at 12. 
 251. King, supra note 206, at 13. 
 252. Id. at 22 (citing a failure to agree on what sort of national catastrophe insurance program 
would work, a fear of unnecessary government intrusion into the private sector, and the concern that 
the “true” cost of such a program could be quite high). 
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adopt floodplain management measures.253 But coverage under NFIP has 
created much confusion due to an apparent overlap with private 
insurance coverage, as well as with other state programs such as Florida’s 
Citizens Property Insurance Corporation (“CPIC”).254 Some have 
claimed that this confusion even facilitated independent claims adjusters 
foisting off onto the federal government Katrina-related damage that 
ought to have been covered by private insurers.255 NFIP detractors claim 
that the program owes billions of dollars to the U.S. Treasury and fails to 
charge premiums that will cover its costs.256 NFIP’s performance, it is 
argued, demonstrates the inevitable failure of any further attempts by 
the federal government to enter into the disaster insurance arena.257 
Other arguments leveled against a federal disaster insurance plan evince 
concerns that such a program may cost tax payers billions and encourage 
coastal development that could harm the environment.258 
While these arguments are well taken, history has shown that the 
federal government is already effectively the insurer of last resort 
following a natural catastrophe.259 Whether Congress sweeps in with an 
ad hoc federal bailout, as it did following Katrina, or whether it 
establishes a proactive, measured approach, people look to the Congress 
to help rebuild their lives when disaster strikes.260 Indeed, most insurance 
market analysts agree that there is not a single state in the union without 
exposure to natural catastrophes.261 Federal bailouts, of course, also come 
from taxpayer pockets and create a false sense of security on the part of 
homeowners, who become apathetic towards taking loss-prevention 
steps.262 There is simply a more economical approach: Congress can work 
directly with the private industry and existing state relief programs in 
 
 253. FEMA, National Flood Insurance Program: Program Description 1 (2002). 
 254. King, supra note 87, at 1–2; Lavitt, supra note 14, at 46. 
 255. Stephanie Grace, Flood Program Free-For-All: Did Insurance Companies Take a Blank 
Check?, Times-Picayune, June 17, 2007, at B7. 
 256. See, e.g., David C. John & Matt Mayer, Homeowners’ Defense Act Rewards States for Bad 
Property Insurance Decisions, The Heritage Found. (July 29, 2009), http://www.heritage.org/Research/ 
Reports/2009/07/Homeowners-Defense-Act-Rewards-States-for-Bad-Property-Insurance-Decisions; 
Eli Lehrer, Ensuring Disaster, Am. Spectator (May 2, 2008, 12:07 AM), http://spectator.org/archives/ 
2008/05/02/ensuring-disaster. 
 257. John & Mayer, supra note 256; Lehrer, supra note 256. 
 258. See, e.g., Justin R. Pidot, Geo. Envtl. L. & Pol’y Inst., Coastal Disaster Insurance in the 
Era of Global Warming 1 (2007); John & Mayer, supra note 256; Arthur D. Postal, Environmental 
Groups Oppose Homeowners Defense Act, Nat’l Underwriter (June 1, 2010, 10:20 AM), 
http://www.property-casualty.com/News/2010/6/Pages/Environmental-Groups-Oppose-Homeowners-
Defense-Act.aspx. 
 259. Orszag & Fontaine, supra note 86, at 17–18. 
 260. Id. at 1. 
 261. Rawle O. King, Cong. Research Serv., RL 33086, Hurricane Katrina: Insurance Losses 
and National Capacities for Financing Disaster Risk 7 (2005).  
 262. Orszag & Fontaine, supra note 86, at 17–18. 
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order to protect Americans from natural catastrophes by reintroducing 
and enacting the Homeowners’ Defense Act of 2009.263 
The HDA was initially introduced in Congress in 2007 and then 
reintroduced by Representative Ron Klein in 2009.264 Although it passed 
the House Financial Services Committee in 2010,265 it has not yet been 
reintroduced in the new session.266 The HDA is a federal catastrophe 
insurance proposal establishing “an integrated public-private partnership” 
that would not only create more disaster coverage at a lower price, but 
also would incentivize the adoption of catastrophe loss-mitigation 
strategies.267 Additionally, the differentiation in premiums that will result 
from the plan may encourage homeowners to remain in or perhaps even 
relocate to less disaster-prone areas, thereby alleviating some concerns 
over environmental effects.268 
Title I of the HDA would establish a voluntary National 
Catastrophe Risk Consortium among participating states.269 Under this 
plan, homeowners would purchase coverage from private or state 
residual insurers, who would then assign some or all of the catastrophe 
risk to state reinsurance programs approved by the Consortium.270 The 
state reinsurance programs would work with the Consortium to transfer 
the risk via insurance-linked securities or coordinated reinsurance 
contracts.271 Title II of the HDA would set forth a three-year federal 
commitment to guarantee or “backstop” debt issued by approved state 
insurance and reinsurance programs that are either involved in 
residential property insurance coverage or designed to enhance the 
private market for such coverage.272 In order to participate, states must 
agree to adopt loss-mitigation programs and zoning and land use plans to 
help mitigate losses caused by natural disasters.273 They must further: 
(1) maintain expressly qualified state programs; (2) prove that their 
 
 263. H.R. 2555, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 264. Rooney Supports Measure to Lower Property Insurance Costs, Congressman Tom Rooney, 
http://rooney.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=3059&Itemid=300045 (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2011); H.R. 3355 [110th]: Homeowners’ Defense Act of 2007, GovTrack.us, 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-3355 (last visited Feb. 2, 2011). 
 265. H.R. 2555: Homeowners’ Defense Act of 2010, OpenCongress, http://www.opencongress.org/ 
bill/111-h2555/actions (last visited Feb. 2, 2011); see also Financial Services Committee Approves 
Homeowners Defense Act, CCH Fin. Reform News Ctr. (Apr. 28, 2010, 3:57 PM), 
http://financialreform.wolterskluwerlb.com/2010/04/financial-services-committee-approves-homeowners-
defense-act.html. 
 266. See Homeowners’ Defense Act of 2010, supra note 4. 
 267. Orszag & Fontaine, supra note 86, at 2, 18–19. 
 268. Id. at 22. 
 269. Rawle O. King, Cong. Research Serv., RL 40680, Financing Catastrophic Risk: Summary 
of the Homeowners’ Defense Act of 2009 (S. 505 and H.R. 2555) 2–3 (2009). 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. at 3. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Orszag & Fontaine, supra note 86, at 2. 
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program’s designs and rates are actuarially sound; and (3) limit state-
issued debt to eighty percent of their qualifying assets, among other 
requirements.274 The U.S. Treasury would charge a fee for each 
guarantee of no more than 0.5%, and any debt incurred by the state 
programs must be repaid within thirty years.275 Title III would establish a 
Federal Natural Catastrophe Reinsurance Fund allowing the state 
programs to purchase one-year “excess-of-loss” reinsurance policies 
from the U.S. Treasury to cover 200-year (and beyond) events, to a 
maximum aggregate federal liability of $200 billion per year.276 Finally, 
Title IV of the HDA would require Mitigation Grant Programs to help 
prevent or mitigate loss caused by natural disasters.277 
From the foregoing, it is easy to see how the HDA would directly 
affect the availability and prevalence of earthquake insurance in 
California. Under Title II, state programs such as the CEA would be able 
to reduce their current dependence on costly annual reinsurance. As a 
result, earthquake coverage premiums would decrease by an estimated 
thirty-five percent, deductibles would be cut in half, and consumers 
would be provided with more choices.278 By the CEA’s own estimation, 
this would double the number of Californians able to purchase 
earthquake insurance and encourage further prophylactic measures to 
protect property from catastrophic loss.279 This strategy will enhance the 
CEA’s impact and will enable California to maximize the utility of its 
plan in preparation for the “big one.” Other disaster-prone states need 
not recreate the wheel. They may follow California’s example, designing 
state plans similar to the CEA in order to benefit from the HDA. 
Because the plan is voluntary, states could choose to opt in or out of the 
program as they see fit. Those states fortunate enough to be less 
vulnerable to major natural disasters may choose to implement 
alternative methods of coverage for their minimal risk, and taxpayers in 
those states will no longer bear responsibility for, at least some, federal 
disaster relief expenses.280 
Opponents to the HDA criticize that, if enacted, it will cost the 
federal government $1.7 billion over the first five years.281 A Congressional 
 
 274. King, supra note 269, at 3–4. 
 275. Id. at 3.  
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 278. Hearings, supra note 2, at 11–13. 
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 280. Orszag & Fontaine, supra note 86, at 24. 
 281. See, e.g., CBO Releases Score of Homeowners’ Defense Act (H.R. 2555), Nat’l Ass’n of 
Prof’l Ins. Agents (June 9, 2010), http://www.pianet.com/NewsCenter/BizPolitics/06-09-10-07.htm 
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Budget Office report issued in 2010 supports these figures, estimating 
that in the first year of the HDA’s existence, state programs would seek 
$7 billion in reinsurance, and opining that the premiums the federal 
government would charge for the program will be insufficient to 
compensate the government fully for the coverage offered.282 Opponents 
have seized upon this report to support the argument that “natural 
catastrophe risk should be placed in the insurance market, not on the 
taxpayers.”283 However, as discussed above, the taxpayers are already 
footing the bill for natural catastrophes. After Hurricane Katrina, the 
federal government commenced a bailout that had amassed to $50 billion 
and counting as of 2008.284 A more proactive approach may, in fact, save 
taxpayer dollars in the long run. 
The benefits to all states and consumers, above and beyond those 
listed, are manifold and impossible to estimate at this point. One study 
puts the possible savings to consumers at $11 billion annually.285 Other 
indirect benefits include those from loss-mitigation strategies such as 
retrofitting, improved land use policies, and stricter building codes.286 All 
told, the savings in every respect will likely be significant. But most 
importantly for our purposes, the HDA will help kill two birds with one 
stone: Along with the judicial measures I have already discussed, 
adoption of the HDA will bulwark the weaknesses in California’s 
approach to the concurrent causation question and the problem of 
catastrophe insurance, thereby establishing a workable solution for other 
states to consider. 
 
 
news.org/article/27850/CBO_High_Price_Tag_on_Beach_House_Bailout.html. Opponents to the HDA 
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Conclusion 
This Note has examined and proposed a solution to the problems 
presented by natural disasters and insurers’ corresponding attempts to 
immunize themselves from liability. At the judicial level, the California 
courts should strictly curtail the effect of recent cases, such as Julian, 
which have undermined California’s approach to concurrent causation. 
At the legislative level, Congress should reintroduce and adopt the 
Homeowners’ Defense Act of 2009. This approach presents a workable 
example for other disaster-prone states and will serve to assuage the 
concerns of courts, insurers, taxpayers, and homeowners alike. 
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